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A,pesky environmental group is constantly ham-
pering your development plans. The group is fiercely
opposed to your project and has attempted to thwart
your efforts. On many occasions, the group has ex-
pressed its concerns to the local zoning authority. It
challenges every permit you seek and went so far as
to submit scathing editorials to the local paper. These
efforts have delayed your project, cost you serious
money, and are making your life miserable.
You believe that the group's concerns are mostly
unfounded, and you are convinced it has given inac-
curate information about the environmental impacts.
If you could make this mob disappear, you are cer-
tain that the project would proceed without further
delay.
You are now considering taking the group to
court, and a local lawyer is eager to file a multi-mil-
lion dollar lawsuit for you. The opposition group has
limited resources, and you think the threat of costly
and protracted litigation will make the group aban-
don its tactics. Will tiling a lawsuit be the answer to
your problems, or will it result in even greater diffi-
culties? This article will help a developer in this situ-
ation answer the question.
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Defining a "SLAPP" Suit
Should our developer file a lawsuit against the
environmental group, the term "SLAPP" will un-
doubtedly pop up on the screen. The acronym was
coined by Professors George W. Pring and Penelope
Canan for a "Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Par-
ticipation."' According to Professors Pring and
Canan, a SLAPP suit consists of the following four
elements:
1. a civil complaint or counterclaim for monetary
damages and/or an injunction;
2. filed against non-governmental individuals or
groups;
3. because of their communication to a governmen-
tal body, official, or the electorate;
4. on an issue of some public interest or concern.
-
To fully characterize a SLAPP, however, a fifth cri-
terion is necessary: "the suits are without merit and
contain an ulterior political or economic motive."'
The paradigm SLAPP suit is an action filed by a
land developer against environmental activists or
neighbors who object to the proposed development.
As in the introductory example, a citizen group may
express environmental concerns to a local zoning
authority, delaying or killing a project. The devel-
oper then sues the group in retaliation for, on aver-
age. $9 million in damages.^ Even though the law-
suit is without merit, the developer hopes that the
general unpleasantness of litigation, its high costs,
and the potential, no matter how remote, of a multi-
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million dollar judgment will stifle the group's oppo-
sition to the development project.
Even using the forgoing five-part definition,
SLAPP suits can be difficult to identify. They are
disguised under a variety of traditional legal theo-
ries, the most frequent of which are defamation and
business torts such as interference with contract or
advantageous relations. Abuse of process, malicious
prosecution, and conspiracy also serve to camouflage
SLAPP suits.* They are indeed the "Where's Waldo?"
of land-use litigation.
The Impact of SLAPP Suits
The First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution grants citizens the right to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of their grievances." This right
has been characterized as one of "the most precious
of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights."'
As aptly explained by one state supreme court,
"[c]itizen access to the institutions ofgovernment
constitutes one ofthe foundations upon which our
republican fonn of government is premised. In a
representative democracy government acts on
behalfof the people, and effective representation
depends to a large extent upon the ability of the
people to make their wishes known to govern-
mental officials acting on their behalf"'
Because SLAPP suits seek to punish citizens for
communicating with governmental bodies, they de-
ter citizens from exercising this important right. This
silencing effect has caused the SLAPP phenomenon
to be criticized as "one of the most troubling legal
trends in our country.'"^
By deterring the exercise of con.stitutional rights,
SLAPP suits detract from balanced input on impor-
tant governmental decisions. City planners depend
largely on the testimony of developers, citizen groups,
and other interested individuals in making land-use
planning decisions. When SLAPP suits discourage
testimony from citizen groups, planning decisions
may become unbalanced and distinctly one-sided in
favor ofdevelopment. In light of these effects, judges
and lawmakers have expressed great concern over the
SLAPP suit.
Judicial Responses to SLAPP Suits
Besides the public-relations nightmare that may
accompany a SLAPP suit, the lawsuit will likely face
close judicial scrutiny.'" The Supreme Court of
Colorado's innovative decision in Protect Our Moun-
tain Environment, Inc. (POME) v. District Court of
County ofJefferson" is indicative of this close scru-
tiny. POME requires the trial court to employ a height-
ened standard of review when a SLAPP-suit defen-
dant (our opposition group) raises the First Amend-
ment petition clause as a defense. In addition to the
stricter review standard, POME also requires the
plaintiff (our developer) to demonstrate the follow-
ing in order to survive a motion to dismiss:
1
.
The defendant' s statements or actions are devoid
of factual or legal merit;
2. The statements or actions are primarily intended
to harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some other
improper objective; and
3. The statements or actions could adversely affect
a legal interest of the plaintiff-
Another state judge proposed that a plaintiff should
have to plead more specific allegations than other-
wise would be required where the conduct underly-
ing a lawsuit \s primafacie protected by the petition
clause of the First Amendment."
Even if the SLAPP suit plaintiff can overcome
these initial hurdles, defendants almost always have
adequate defenses to the plaintiffs claims. Defama-
tion, the most common tort alleged in a SLAPP suit,
is defined as a false written or oral statement that
tends to injure the plaintiffs reputation "so as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him."'"
A SLAPP suit plaintiffmay have a difficult time pre-
vailing on a defamation claim because pure opinions
are excluded from the scope of the tort.'^ Even if the
defendants' statements or comments are false, they
may still prevail. Plaintiffs who are public figures
must prove with "convincing clarity" that the defen-
dant acted with actual malice—with knowledge that
the statements were false or were made with reckless
disregard of their truth. "^' In the SLAPP suit context,
land-use developers involved in public approval pro-
cesses such as rezoning and permit applications have




Defendants likewise have ready defenses to other
typical SLAPP suit claims such as interference with
contract and other business torts. To dismiss these
claims, courts often rely on the constitutional right to
petition and the associated Noerr-Penniiigton doc-
trine. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine originated in a
trio of federal anti-trust cases as a rule of statutory
construction, designed to avoid clashes between the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and First Amendment peti-
tioning rights.'^ The doctrine has since been expanded
beyond its anti-trust origins to protect petitioning from
other causes of action. Reduced to its essentials,
Noerr-Pennington insulates non-"sham" petitioning
activities from all liability whatsoever."
In addition to the
strong likelihood of los-
ing the merits of a
SLAPP suit, the filer
faces court-imposed
sanctions. Rule 1 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and many
state counterparts im- ^
pose a duty on attorneys
to certify that they have
conducted a reasonable inquiry before filing suit. The
attorney must have determined that any papers filed
with the court are well grounded in fact and law, and
not imposed for an improper purpose such as "to ha-
rass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation."-" The court may either on
its own initiative, or at the request ofthe SLAPP suit
defendant, move to sanction an attorney for violating
this rule.
North Carolina courts have this authority pursu-
ant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1 A- 1 , Rule 11 . A violation of
the rule requires the court to impose an "appropriate
sanction," and it may be imposed against the attor-
ney, the represented party, or both. Sanctions may
include an order that the party violating the rule pay
the reasonable attorneys" fees incurred by the other
party as a result of the baseless pleading or paper.
Under the so-called "American Rule," in nearly all
cases, litigants pay their own legal bills, whether they
win or lose. Shifting the financial burden can be a
powerful sanction.
Perhaps the most significant consequence of fil-
ing a SLAPP suit is the risk of being SLAPPed-Back.
The victim of a SLAPP suit may turn around and sue
the SLAPP-suit plaintiff for abuse of process, mali-
cious prosecution, violation of constitutional rights,
or violation of civil rights statutes. SLAPP-Backs,
Perhaps the most significant
consequence of fihng a
SLAPP suit is the risk of
being SLAPPed-Back.
unlike SLAPP suits, have fared quite well in court,
and have resulted in generous verdicts as high as $ 1 1 .
1
and$13million.2'
As reported in a St. Louis, Missouri newspaper,
a recent SLAPP-Back resulted in a $2.65 million ver-
dict against a St. Louis developer.-- In 1980, approxi-
mately one year after Carl and Rita Fust moved into
their new home, the developer unveiled plans for a
commercial development that would abut the Fusts'
property. Unhappy with this prospect, Rita Fust or-
ganized a petition drive, and the County Council voted
against the project.
In the mid-1980s, the developer obtained ap-
proval for, and subsequently built, a scaled-down
project that the Fusts
didn't oppose. In Janu-
ary of 1990, however,
the developer started
building a fence to sepa-
rate his property from
the Fusts and other
neighbors. Concerned
that the fence would be
aesthetically unpleasing
and that workers might
trespass on his property, Mr. Fust wrote a letter to
the developer, and sent copies to his neighbors and a
county councilman.
The developer then sued Mr. Fust for $ 1 million,
alleging that he was libeled in the letter. The devel-
oper offered to drop the lawsuit if the Fusts agreed
not to interfere with any zoning requests, to apolo-
gize for the fence letter, and to fork over $25,000.
When Mr. Fust refused, the developer responded by
adding Mrs. Fust to the lawsuit. The Fusts hired their
own lawyer, and the developer's lawsuit was dis-
missed in 1992. Three months later, the Fusts sued
the developer for abuse ofprocess and malicious pros-
ecution.
The developer declined to attend the trial or tes-
tify, so portions ofhis deposition testimony were read
to the jury. When asked why he thought his lawsuit
was worth $ 1 million, he explained that the Fusts had
fought the development from day one, that they con-
stantly called the county, and that they organized a
petition. The Fusts were awarded $2.65 million in
damages.
It is easy to agree with Professors Pring's and
Canan's observation that "SLAPPs, as lawsuits go,
are losers."-^ They are "losers" not only in the sense
that the defendant will likely prevail on the merits,
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but also because the filer risks adverse publicity, pos-
sible sanctions, and a large SLAPP-Back verdict.
This is not to say, however, that developers are
not mistreated or that they do not have any recourse.
They are and they do. In a recent Massachusetts case,
a developer plaintiff filed suit against a group of
homeowners for defamation and intentional interfer-
ence with contractual and advantageous relations.-"
The corporate plaintiff alleged that the defendant
homeowners constantly "badmouthed" it. The plain-
tiff also accused the homeowners of advertising their
houses for sale, not because they planned on selling,
but to discourage potential sales in the development.
The homeowners characterized the lawsuit as a
SLAPP, and moved to
dismiss it on the basis
that their actions were
protected. The court,
however, denied the mo-
tion. In the court's opin-
ion, the homeowners'
conduct, if proven, was
not protected petitioning
or speech—rather, it
amounted to "economic coercion" to force the de-
veloper to convert a common drive into a public
street."
The real problem is in navigating the foggy wa-
ters just offshore of the shoals of SLAPP. When is a
lawsuit a means to proper redress and when is it a
tool of intimidation?
Legislative Responses to SLAPP Suits
The SLAPP problem has recently received a great
deal of attention by state legislatures.^'" In an effort
to reduce the number of SLAPP suits, legislation has
been enacted in a significant number of states,-' and
introduced in a number of others.-** One citizen group
has even proposed federal legislation addressing the
problem of SLAPPs.-"
The typical anti-SLAPP statute affords the vic-
tim a speedy means of dismissing the lawsuit, and
awards the victim its costs and attorneys' fees upon
dismissal. Recent decisions addressing legislation in
California, Massachusetts, and New York illustrate
the scope of anti-SLAPP legislation and the difficul-
ties that arise when legislating in a complex area such
as SLAPPs.
When is a lawsuit a means to
proper redress and when is it
a tool of intimidation?
California
In 1992, California enacted legislation establish-
ing a special motion to strike lawsuits that are based
upon a defendant's exercise of the right of petition or
free speech in connection with a public issue.'" To
withstand the motion, the plaintiff must show a "prob-
ability" of prevailing on the claim. In making this
determination, the court considers the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts
upon which the liability or defense is based. If the
plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the lawsuit is dis-
missed, and the defendant is entitled to an award of
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
Several decisions
have addressed the scope
of the California anti-
SLAPP statute, the most
important of which is
Wilcox V. Superior
Court?^ In that case, the
court clarified certain as-
pects of the statute. First,
the SLAPP-suit defen-
dant has the prima facie burden of showing that the
statute applies. This requires the defendant to show
that he or she has been sued based upon a written or
oral statement made (1) before a governmental pro-
ceeding or official; (2) in connection with an issue
under consideration or review by a governmental
body or official; or (3) in a place open to the public
or a public forum in connection with an issue of pub-
lic interest.
Second, Wilcox clarified that the court may use
affidavits only to examine the true nature of a
plaintiffs claims. Thus, a SLAPP-suit defendant may
submit affidavits to explain that what appears on the
face of a complaint to be a claim for defamation or
interference with business advantage is in reality a
blatant attack on protected petitioning activity. The
court may not weigh competing affidavits to resolve
factual disputes in determining the probability of the
plaintiffs success in the lawsuit. By using affidavits
only to show the context and background that may
be absent from the face of the complaint, rather than
to decide a factual issue that would otherwise be re-
solved by the jury, the court does not deprive the de-
fendant of the right to a jury trial.
Wilcox's limitation on the use of affidavits and
pleadings avoids a problem that prevented the enact-
ment of New Hampshire anti-SLAPP legislation in
1 994. In Opinion ofthe Justices (SLAPP Suit Proce-
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dure),^^ the Supreme Court ofNew Hampshire ren-
dered an advisory opinion that a New Hampshire
Senate Bill, modelled after California's anti-SLAPP
statute, would be unconstitutional if enacted. Focus-
ing on the statutory language requiring the court to
consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing
affidavits, the New Hampshire court explained that
weighing the pleadings and affidavits to determine a
"probability" of success would deny a defendant's
right to have all factual questions resolved by the jury.
Another interesting decision addressing the Cali-
fornia statute is Liidwig v. Superior Court." In
Liidwig, the court held that a developer's efforts to
impede a mall project were within the scope of the
statute. (That's not a mistake—a developer's efforts
to stop development.) The defendant developer had
supported and encouraged others to speak out against
the plaintiff developer at public hearings.
In light of the environmental effects associated
with the development of a mall, including increased
traffic and impacts on natural drainage, the court con-
cluded that the competing developer's actions con-
cerned a matter of public interest, and thus were
within the scope of the statute. The court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that the statute was inapplicable
because the defendant merely encouraged others to
speak out, but did not directly communicate with a
governmental authority. Because the statute applied,
the plaintiff was required to show a probability of
success on the merits in order to survive the special
motion to dismiss."
Massachusetts
Enacted in 1994 over the governor's veto, Mas-
sachusetts anti-SLAPP statute is applicable when a
party has been sued based upon the "exercise of its
right of petition" under either the United States or
Massachusetts constitution." The phrase "exercise
of its right of petition" is broadly defined under the
statute, and encompasses any written or oral state-
ment:
1. Made before or submitted to a governmental
body or proceeding;
2. Made in connection with an issue under consid-
eration or review by a governmental body or pro-
ceeding;
3. Reasonably likely to encourage consideration or
review of an issue by a governmental body or
proceeding;
4. Reasonably likely to enlist public participation
in an effort to effect such consideration; or
5. Otherwise falling within constitutional protec-
tion of the right to petition government.
Pursuant to the Massachusetts statute, a party who
has allegedly been SLAPPed may file a "special
motion to dismiss," which requires the non-moving
party to show that the moving party's exercise of its
right to petition was "devoid of any reasonable fac-
tual support or any arguable basis in law," and that
the moving party's actions caused actual injury to
the responding party. The statute limits discovery
once the motion to dismiss has been filed, and man-
dates the award of costs and attorneys' fees if the
moving party prevails.
Less than a year after its enactment, the statute
has been successfully invoked on several occasions.
In Thomson v. Town ofAndover Board ofAppeals,^''
a trial judge granted a special motion to dismiss a
defamation counterclaim where the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the issuance of a special zoning permit, and
their letters regarding the zoning dispute were pub-
lished in The Boston Globe. A judge also granted a
special motion to dismiss in Jordan v. Murray,'^''
where the plaintiff developer sued an individual for
defamation and tortious interference claims. The de-
fendant in Jordan sought to determine through let-
ters and petitions to an administrative agency whether
the plaintiffwas in compliance with wetlands require-
ments. The plaintiffs lawsuit was premised on these
efforts, as well as allegedly untrue statements made
by the defendant to his neighbors regarding the de-
velopment.
Of particular significance to developers is the
recent "badmouthing" decision, "the first in favor of
a developer under the new statute. "^^ In Wigwam
.Associates. Inc. v. McBride,^" the trial court denied a
special motion to dismiss because the alleged state-
ments and conduct ofthe defendants were "made and
performed outside the context of petitioning the gov-
ernment. "^° The defendants had unsuccessfully peti-
tioned the governm.ent to force the plaintiff devel-
oper to convert a private common drive into a public
street. Rather than give up, the defendants continu-
ously "badmouthed" the developer to potential buy-
ers, and they put "for sale" signs on their lawns, not
to advertise actual availability, but to discourage po-
tential sales. Assuming the truth of the developer's
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allegations for purposes ofthe motion to dismiss, the
judge concluded that the defendants' actions were
taken to drive the developer out of business or to com-
pel him to modify the common drive, and thus did
not fall within the scope of the Massachusetts stat-
ute.
The fact pattern in WigM'am parallels a recent dis-
pute in Maryland. In what has been described as a
"threat to SLAPP," a builder threatened to sue resi-
dents that picketed and placed for-saie signs on their
property to protest the lack of parking spaces in their
townhouse community."' Although a lawsuit pre-
mised on the residents' picketing activities raises se-
rious constitutional questions, the residents' use of
the "for sale" signs is more suspect. Assuming the
residents had no intention
of selling their properties,
and were merely using the
signs as part of a coordi-
nated effort to cause eco-
nomic harm to the builder
and to drive him to the bar-
gaining table, this conduct
would not be protected as
in (Vig^^'an!.
Traindafilouv. Kravchuk'- isalso worthy of note.
In that case, the corporate defendant sought to ex-
pand its shopping center. The corporate plaintiff, the
owner of a neighboring shopping center, objected to
the expansion plans, and filed suit alleging that the
defendant failed to comply with applicable zoning
regulations. In retaliation, the defendant filed a coun-
terclaim for improper interference with contractual
relations. The plaintiff then moved to dismiss the
counterclaim under Massachusetts" anti-SLAPP stat-
ute, but the judge denied the motion in an unwritten
bench ruling, apparently on the grounds that tiie stat-
ute only protected individuals.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
accepted the case on its own motion, and will ad-
dress whether Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP statute
applies to a lawsuit between competing corporate
developers. The court must decide whether, as ad-
vanced by the plaintiff, the statute's plain language
applies to the counterclaim as the language is not lim-
ited to individuals, or whether the defendant correctly
contends that the legislature intended the statute only
to apply to citizens engaged in public debate, but not
to a company acting for private profit. It will be in-
teresting to see whether the Massachusetts court lim-
its the scope of the statute to individuals, or holds
that it applies to competing developers as did the
Rushing into a lawsuit
may be the last thing the
developer should do.
Ludwig V. Superior Court decision in addressing the
scope of the California statute.
New York
In 1992, New York also enacted legislation to
combat the problem of SLAPPs. The New York stat-
ute establishes a cause of action against the filer of a
SLAPP suit that is "materially related to any efforts
of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on,
challenge or oppose such application or permis-
sion.""' The cause of action benefits a SLAPP suit
defendant if the plaintiff is a "person who has ap-
plied for or obtained a permit, zoning change, lease,
license, certificate or other entitlement for use or per-
mission to act from any
government body, or any
person with an interest,
connection or affiliation
with such [a] person that is
materially related to such
application or permis-
sion.""" In such a case, the
defendant may sue the
plaintiff for damages, costs, and attorneys' fees.
In addition to establishing a cause of action on
behalf of the SLAPP suit defendant, the legislature
also enabled the defendant to obtain early dismissal
of the SLAPP suit unless the plaintiff can demon-
strate that the "cause of action has a substantial basis
in fact and law or is supported by a substantial argu-
ment for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.""' By requiring a "substantial basis,"
the New York statute places a greater burden on the
filer of the SLAPP suit than do other state statutes.
Nevertheless, a New York court is not required to
award costs and attorneys' fees when the SLAPP suit
plaintiff fails to meet this burden. Unlike California
and Massachusetts, an award of costs and fees is dis-
cretionary in New York, not mandatory.""
Conclusions
Even though the developer's legal counsel in the
introductory hypothetical is eager to file suit against
the environmental group, this article should cause the
developer to "stop and think" before giving his attor-
ney the go ahead. Rushing into a lawsuit may be the
last thing the developer should do. Although the de-
veloper considers the editorials "scathing," do they
contain false information or mere opinions? Even if
the information is false, might the developer be con-
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sidered a public figure, and, if so, does he believe
that the group acted with actual malice? Is the
developer's motive in filing a lawsuit to punish the
group for exercising its constitutional right to com-
municate with the local zoning authority, and to si-
lence it from further communications? Does the gov-
erning jurisdiction have an anti-SLAPP statute or a
sanctions rule? The developer should discuss all of
these issues with his attorney before proceeding with
a lawsuit.
Many articles have been written on SLAPP suits,
and this article has not attempted to reiterate their
content."' It will have served its purpose if the reader
has a basic understanding of SLAPP suits, their so-
cial impact, and judicial and legislative responses to
the SLAPP suit phenomenon. By understanding the
concept of SLAPP suits, the reader will hopefully
avoid their costly consequences. <ai>
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